Abstract: This paper discusses seven propositions:
Introduction
In this paper we draw largely on a recent international assessment entitled Human Choice and Climate Change [1] , to explore the interplay of climate change, poverty, and equity at the national level. By understanding this interplay, we hope to establish the ground for improving both our understanding of these issues and our practical ability to address them. This process will facilitate the incorporation of development, equity and sustainability concerns into the work of the IPCC [2, 3] .
In the following pages we note first that climate change and poverty are linked by the issue of vulnerability, the capacity to be harmed. Indicators of vulnerability and resilience (the capacity to adapt without harm) require a strong social component as well as physical and economic components. We also note that the hardest equity issues seem to arise because of qualitative differences in the nature of climate change and policy impacts on the poor and those who are better off. It seems that the dominant paradigm for decision-making, utilitarianism, leads analysts and policy makers to focus on the welfare of highly aggregated populations and to exclude the problems of the local distribution of impacts.
The core of our discussion is based on the argument that poverty cannot be understood in terms of lack of goods or income, or even of basic needs, but must rather be viewed in terms of people's ability to participate in the social discourse that shapes their lives. Emerging multi-dimensional measures of poverty are much better than those based on income or needs, but may continue to underestimate socio-cultural factors. Furthermore, we suggest that eliminating poverty and developing societal resilience require building social diversity and a strong focus on local level institutions. In the final analysis, we argue, climate protection and poverty elimination may be most effectively achieved through local-level actors and their global networks.
We round-off the discussion by noting some of the problems of connecting local and global levels of analysis and policy making, in particular that climate change and policy impacts on the poor do not conform very well to analytic dichotomies of national and international or intragenerational and intergenerational equity.
Climate, vulnerability, and poverty
Our first proposition is that climate change and poverty are linked by the issue of vulnerability. Indicators of vulnerability and resilience require a strong social component as well as physical and economic components.
"Among geophysical agents, weather and climate are by far the most lethal to humankind worldwide. Together flood, hurricane, and drought account for 75% of the world's natural disasters. Only earthquakes exact a comparable toll." [4, p.238 ].
The IPCC impacts methodology has been critiqued from several quarters (e.g., [4] [5] [6] ) for its overwhelming focus on changes in natural conditions. By treating climate impacts as wholly climatic, the Second Assessment Report elided the characteristics of societies, individuals, groups, places, systems, and activities that cause them to lose or gain to differing degrees from particular weather and climate events. As Meyer et al. point out, knowing the physical attributes of a climatic variation or change is never adequate for understanding or predicting its consequences for human society. The intense concentration of research effort to date on projecting the physical attributes of climate change thus skimps an equally essential task: of clarifying what those attributes mean and for whom.
The vulnerability of populations and activities is the most widely used umbrella concept for those factors that mediate between geophysical events and human losses. As vulnerability and its causes play essential roles in determining impacts, understanding the dynamics of vulnerability is as important as monitoring and predicting climate change and variation. Vulnerability is a composite concept, incorporating environmental, social, economic, political, cultural, and psychological factors, in describing the capacity for damage. It draws attention to the amplifiers or attenuators of the impacts of climate change and channels them towards certain groups, certain institutions, and certain places. It also emphasizes the degree to which the risks of climate catastrophe can be cushioned or ameliorated by adaptive actions that are or can be brought within the reach of populations at risk [4] .
As Rahman et al. [7] point out, central problems in this endeavour are to define vulnerability and resilience and to identify relevant markers or indicators of each. For example, industrialized countries seem to be vulnerable to violent storms in terms of physical infrastructure but not in terms of human lives, while the opposite vulnerabilities characterize less industrialized countries.
The IPCC methodology for assessing vulnerability in coastal zones focused on people, land, and infrastructure at risk, arriving at quantitative estimates for each. The assumption of such an assessment is that people, land, and infrastructure should remain as they are today, i.e., no change will be a good change. Meyer et al. [4] define vulnerability by negative impacts of a climate event on particular societies; included in the vulnerability assessment are political and economic systems, and other institutional arrangements. Changes in regional patterns of habitability would exacerbate existing problems for poor populations living in environmentally vulnerable areas, such as lowlying tropical regions. Here we may anticipate that the numbers of poor people who go hungry, get sick, and die young will increase.
In comparing the vulnerability of populations, researchers distinguish between differences in physical exposure to the hazardous agent and different abilities to cope with its impacts. The former are closely associated with biophysical, and the latter with socioeconomic, differentiation. Aspects of the biophysical environment may be important sources of coping ability and differences in exposure to hazards may be the consequence of socioeconomic differences.
"No standard framework exists for identifying different sources of vulnerability, but clearly they are numerous and complex. Poverty is generally recognized as one of the most important correlates of vulnerability to hazard, but it is also recognized as being neither necessary nor sufficient for it. The very young and the old are often identified as especially vulnerable. Other categories widely invoked are differences in health, gender, ethnicity, education, and experience with the hazard in question. Empirical local-level studies reveal such complex mosaics of vulnerability as to cast doubt upon attempts to describe patterns and estimate trends at the global or even the regional scale. Vulnerability to global climate change is likely to be as complex". [4, p.240] However, social science research [1] should warn us off comparable vulnerability league tables and broad pronouncements. Some researchers argue that the industrialized world is more vulnerable because of increasing interdependencies and rigidities in the industrial system and its supporting infrastructures. Other researchers have argued that the vulnerability of the less industrialized world is greater because of its immediate dependence on agriculture. Wherever and in whatever form vulnerability is encountered, it makes sense to focus on building the resilience of both industrialized and less industrialized societies. This can be achieved both by upgrading appropriate physical infrastructure and by increasing the social capacity of populations to learn from and cope with a changing environment.
For vulnerable countries that may be small emitters, such as small island states, Nishioka [8] identifies a further benefit of policies designed to build resilience. He points out that reliance on mitigation policies alone leaves such countries hostage to the actions of other nations, a situation that seems both disempowering and inequitable.
In addressing the issue of vulnerability, climate change analysts should identify potential opportunities to increase the capacities of societies to deal with problems that may result from climate change and other environmental changes (e.g., water and air pollution, over-fishing). In particular, the needs of the most vulnerable, including the poor, should command our attention. When all is said and done, building both the social and financial capital of the poor may be their best defence. This would suggest that the IPCC would benefit from indicators of vulnerability and resilience with a strong social component as well as physical and economic components. Such indicators might include the number and circulation of newspapers, participation in elections, and levels of NGO activity (including sporting, cultural, and environmental associations).
Vulnerability and climate change
Our second proposition is that the hardest equity issues arise because of qualitative differences in the effects of climate change and climate change policy on the poor and those who are better off.
The equity principle underlying economic analyses of climate burdens at the national level is avowedly utilitarian. The criterion for decision making is the greatest happiness of the greatest number. The rise of utilitarianism as an explicit decision making principle in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries paralleled the development of systems of national accounting and statistics. These systems were designed to assess and facilitate the development of industrial capitalism. They also held out the prospect of civil or corporate leaders being able to rationally assess the impact of decisions on the well-being of the statistical population. But, as we will shortly suggest, the utilitarian equity principle is not adequate for the task of dealing with differential impacts.
The utilitarian principle domesticated moral diversity for decision-making authorities by offering the capability to measure and monitor the stocks and flows of societal good, the usual proxy for 'good' being wealth in some form. In many climate change analyses, GDP is the accepted aggregate measure of well-being. By the same process, decisionmaker awareness of alternative ethical considerations is systematically attenuated. The imperative to provide for societal good at the highest level of aggregation provides no guidance for securing the happiness of minorities and individuals, even of those individuals in the happy majority.
"The guiding criterion for policy is the greatest good for society, quantitatively defined. But contemporary utilitarians, primarily economists and theorists of public choice, like Bentham, still have no principle for distributing this social good according to manifest principles of equity". [9, p.40] Utilitarianism is compatible with a top-down decision making rationality. Indeed, the imperative to maximize the happiness of the greatest number requires a panoptic viewpoint.
In contrast, rights-based approaches to equity, such as Kant's, lead researchers and decision makers to focus on the face-to-face community rather than the nation state and direct the attention of scholars working in that paradigm to the particular circumstances of decision making rather than to the aggregate outcome. Attention to disaggregated particulars articulates with an orientation towards bottom-up, rather than top-down decision-making. In climate change discourse, scientists report stories of individuals, families, and villages far removed from total or per capita GDP.
Increasing insight into the diversity of motives, values, and preferences of individuals actually tends to frustrate utilitarian social accountancy, which depends on blending out such distinctions in the process of aggregation.
"Most utilitarians assume, like the adherents of the politics of interest, that the sole legitimate basis of social good is what individuals happen to value. And they view the process of social choice as an aggregative one, in which individual preferences are added to one another in arriving at decisions on the substance of social welfare." [9, p.71] It is hardly surprising therefore, that the insights derived from local level analysis and from the local knowledge of the poor themselves are not merely considered irrelevant to, but actually have to be excluded from utilitarian decision making in order to preserve the rationality and legitimacy of the utility principle.
The solution that provides the greatest happiness of the greatest number also must be an efficient solution, since any departure from efficiency, also by definition, reduces the amount of good available for distribution. "A bias toward the value of efficiency is inherent in the methods of policy analysis and utilitarianism has been the ideological position most forthrightly incorporating this standard as a central value." [9, p.38] However, efficiency is not merely a technical issue or an indication of rational behaviour within utilitarianism, but is also an intrinsically moral imperative that arises from the utility principle itself.
As Elster points out in his instant classic Local Justice [10] , local decisions tend to be more pragmatic, negotiated outcomes than national decisions and global debates in which considerations of efficiency tend to predominate.
Hence, the distinction between utilitarian and rights-based approaches to equity is not merely an artefact for the history of ideas or a scholarly distinction of mere academic interest. It actually lies at the heart of the crisis of governance that pervades the local, national, and global communities at the close of the 20th century, that is, the tension between interdependence and independence, between pursuit of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, and the assertion of individual, local, or ethnic rights that ought not to be violated even at the expense of the aggregate good. Is it more important to reduce global GDP losses or to prevent the displacement of the population of the Maldives? Whereas Kant's principle that every person is to be regarded as an end in him or herself is generally recognized as a form of the doctrine of human rights, Bentham dismissed the concept of rights as "plain nonsense" and the imprescriptible rights of man as "nonsense on stilts" [11, p.742] . He denounced the articles of the Declaration des droits de l'homme as falling into three classes: "Those that are unintelligible, those that are false, and those that are both." [11, p.742] Similar vituperation for the social inefficiency of rights-based ethics is not unheard of among contemporary utilitarians. For example, in response to proposals by Bullard, a sociologist, that current inequities in the distribution of environmental burdens on minorities and the poor should be addressed on an environmental rights basis, rather than according to risk-based criteria, Nichols, an economist, responded:
"This framework has considerable popular appeal, but it ultimately is counterproductive from the perspectives of both society as a whole and even the specific groups it tries to champion. Moreover, it provides little practical guidance to environmental decision makers trying to set priorities. ...Bullard's proposed environmental justice framework makes continued inequities in protection more likely..." [12, p.367] Bullard replied that his proposals:
"…are no more regressive than the initiatives taken in the nineteenth century in eliminating slavery and 'Jim Crow' measures in the USA. This argument was a sound one in the 1860s when the 13th Amendment of the Constitution was passed despite the opposition of proslavery advocates, who posited that the new law would create unemployment (slaves had a zero unemployment rate), drive up wages (slaves worked for free), and inflict undue hardship on the plantation economy (loss of absolute control of privately owned human property)." [13, p.260] Clearly these are not merely technical arguments about the best way to protect the environment. Similar clashes between the utilitarian and rights-based views arise over the projected costs of climate change. In response to damage estimates that climate change will result in a decline of global productivity of less than 1% over the course of the next century, utilitarians have expressed the view that only low-cost mitigation measures can be justified. On the other hand, those who espouse a rights-based approach point out that even less than 1% of global productivity over 100 hundred years may translate into considerable suffering and premature death for millions of poor people in vulnerable regions of the less industrialized world.
The key point is that different kinds of vulnerability may be experienced by the poor and better-off communities discussed above. When Hurricane Andrew hit the Florida coast, loss of human life was numbered in the tens; property damage was sustained in the billions. In the same year, the cyclone in Bangladesh killed over one hundred thousand people, but resulted in property damage that was negligible compared to that which occurred in Florida. However, economic losses are compensable, and although several insurance companies complained of the burden, fair restitution was made to those who suffered losses. No restitution can be made to the dead of Bangladesh, and the lives of the survivors could not be made whole by providing them with new parents, siblings, or children.
Thus, there seems to be a qualitative difference between better-off communities who can be compensated for the kinds of losses that they would incur from climate impacts and poor communities, whose losses are more likely to be uncompensable. This fact presents policymakers with a particular responsibility to focus on the needs of the poor if they intend to uphold the lowest-common-denominator equity principle that climate change and policies should not exacerbate existing inequities or leave the already poor worse off than they are today.
The idea of poverty
This brings us to our third proposition: poverty cannot be understood in terms of lack of goods or income, or even of basic needs, but must rather be understood in terms of people's ability to participate in the social discourse that shapes their lives.
Poverty, as we understand it today, appears to be yet another of those double-edged inventions of the European Enlightenment tradition. For sure, huge disparities of wealth existed before the enlightenment. However, these disparities have not always carried the social meaning and embodied the political imperatives that they do today. Indeed, in many cases, poverty was historically equated with simplicity or asceticism rather than suffering. Especially among religious orders in Europe and Asia, poverty was thus considered a virtue to be acquired rather than a handicap to be overcome.
Many traditional societies in Africa, Asia, and South America lived for centuries with universally shared levels of infant mortality, longevity, and technology that we would now consider characteristic of the extremely poor. However, within these societies poverty did not exist. Indeed, at least one major scholar of hunting and gathering societies has described them as the 'original affluent societies'. Sahlins [14] describes how peoples as far apart as the Kalahari Bushmen and the Yahgan of Tierra del Fuego enjoy "'a kind of material plenty,' at least in the realm of everyday useful things...." According to Sahlins and others, such peoples had extensive leisure time available for philosophy, cosmology, storytelling, decorative arts, and simply spending time with the family. They achieved this affluence by restricting wants to a limited range of resources that are plentiful in their environment and actually limiting the accumulation of possessions to those that could be carried on their persons.
Such limitations on wants are by no means unique to exotic or technologically simple societies. Dennis et al. [15] describe various methods of income levelling and restraints on conspicuous consumption among West Yorkshire coal miners in the 1950s and 60s in order to maintain the cohesion of the community. The restrictions on dress, personal consumption, and use of domestic technology among the Amish of Pennsylvania help to preserve group solidarity and guarantee the availability of capital for essential resources [16] .
The Bushmen, Yahgan, Yorkshire miners, and the Amish were all able to shape the utility functions of their members even, in the latter cases, when they were constantly exposed to the wide range of goods that enticed members of neighbouring communities and compared to whom they might be considered 'poor.' In so doing they were able to maintain cohesive and resilient communities.
The key to the post-Enlightenment conception of poverty seems to be the idea of scarcity. Nicholas Xenos [17] argues cogently that prior to the Enlightenment scarcity was always specific, denoting difficulty in obtaining specific commodities or resources. For example, despite their extraordinary skill in locating it and extracting it from unlikely places, Bushmen must have experienced scarcity of water in a desert environment, at least from time to time. However, the Enlightenment ushered in a new, generalized notion of scarcity that underpinned the subsequent evolution of the science of economics and the idea of consumer demand.
The concept of consumer demand has evolved over some 300 years, but is essentially rooted in the twin ideas of scarcity of goods and, despite the diminishing marginal utility of specific goods, the overall insatiability of consumer wants. As Michael Thompson and Karl Dake express it:
"The nonsatiety requirement (of economics) does not insist that we can never have enough of something; only that we can never have enough of things in the plural. A person may become pig-sick of smoked salmon but he or she, economists assert, will always prefer a larger bundle of goods to a smaller one" [18] .
From this perspective, poverty is understood as the lack of material plenty, usually equated with lack of income; the inability to satisfy insatiably escalating expectations of access to material goods and services. When we encounter poverty, thus defined, we frequently encounter other social pathologies, such as corruption, crime, and violence, which we readily attribute to the poor's lack of means to satisfy wants. Whether the context is rural Asia or inner-city America, our solutions have been strikingly similar; invest money in economic development then social cohesion and resilience will follow. Only we did, and it didn't.
Perhaps that was because we were not investing in quite the right sorts of resources to jump start the poor into the consumer economy? Perhaps economists had been mistaken in refusing to distinguish real human needs from mere wants. We became more sophisticated and identified basic needs that had to be satisfied to lift people out of poverty. Following in the footsteps of the psychologist Abraham Maslow [19] , various hierarchies of need were devised to help identify development priorities. Figure 1 illustrates Maslow's pyramid of needs, which assumes that each level of need must be satisfied before someone moves up to the next. Thus physical needs for food and safety are assumed to be prior conditions for love, esteem, and self-actualization. Such schemes can be, and have been, used to justify prioritizing environmental protection over other policies (such as housing, employment, etc) by linking it to physical survival in one way or another [20] [21] [22] . The same kind of hierarchical thinking about needs is also used by some national governments to justify postponing environmental policy, particularly carbon emission controls, until the lower, arguably more pressing needs for adequate nutrition and shelter have been met.
Figure 1 Maslow's needs pyramid
Source: adapted from Maslow [19, 43] There have been many attempts in the Maslowian tradition to define hierarchies of need as the basis for development policy and poverty eradication. For instance Drenowski and Scott [23] proposed a "level of living index" in which welfare components were grouped into three kinds: basic physical needs (nutrition, shelter, and health), basic cultural needs (education, leisure, and security), and higher needs. Higher needs were assumed to be met with only surplus income (a dubious concept in itself, which suggests that most people never satisfy their higher needs). Allardt [24, 25] sought to redress the materialist bias of the Swedish model of welfare research by identifying three categories of needs: having (control of impersonal resources), loving (companionship and solidarity), and being (self-actualization) as necessary conditions for human development.
However, hierarchies of needs do not stand up well to critical examination. How do we account for the Somali woman who preferred to die rather than suffer the shame of arriving naked at a famine relief station? The concept of basic human needs has universal rhetorical appeal, but cannot be made operational coherently in a way that helps policymakers to define climate policy goals. Everyone may agree that clean air, access to potable water, a minimum ration of calories and protein, and even entitlements to atmospheric carbon sinks are all somehow basic human needs, but, in practice, it is impossible to devise universally standardized measures or indicators for their operationalization. How clean is clean? How pure is potable? What constitutes access? What is the age and level of activity of the individual to be fed? The economists seem to be right after all in supposing that needs and wants cannot be usefully distinguished. Needs turn out to be wants that someone is unwilling to give up. So long as researchers and policymakers continue to treat wants as private appetites, they cannot understand how wants come to be standardized in society to provide markers of affluence and poverty and how those standards change.
Economists assume that people demand goods to satisfy internal urges. Anthropologists proceed from a different assumption, that a person wants goods to fulfill personal commitments.
"Commodities do not satisfy desire; they are only tools or instruments for satisfying it. Goods are not ends. Goods are for distributing, sharing, consuming, or destroying publicly in one way or another. To focus exclusively on how persons relate to objects can never illuminate desire. Instead research should focus on the patterns of alliance and authority that are made and marked in all human societies by the circulation of goods. demand for objects is a chart of social commitments graded, and time-tabled for the year, or the decade or the lifetime." [26, p.202] As Douglas [27] remarked more than two decades ago, restricting consumption of goods restricts participation in the extended social conversation for which they are used. Lacking the right goods in the right quantities is not merely an issue of disappointed desire, it is tantamount to social deafness and muteness. Poverty is not merely about experiencing restrictions on individual consumption, it is the inability to participate in society and to respond collectively (as a family, community, or nation) to political, social, economic, and environmental change.
Conceived of in this way, we should distinguish between poverty and destitution. The latter is an acute state of crisis in which an absolute lack of food, water, and shelter is life threatening. Poverty, on the other hand, is a chronic, systematic exclusion of people from society, and its effects are cumulative (for example, lack of education restricting access to employment throughout a lifetime.) Destitution and poverty, being different states require different approaches. Destitution is an emergency situation calling for immediate relief. It is sustainable neither in the short term or the long term. Poverty is a social issue, and though we could argue that it may be a permanent feature of most societies, the fullest possible participation of people in civic life is surely a central goal of any vision of sustainable development.
To understand climate impacts on the poor as well as constraints and opportunities for the poor to participate in climate policy measures, the IPCC Third Assessment Report will have to extend the treatment of poverty beyond national GDP statistics and GINI coefficients. This will require using multi-dimensional measures of poverty and development for both impacts assessment and mitigation scenarios.
Measuring poverty and development
Our fourth proposition is that emerging multi-dimensional measures of poverty are much better than those based on income or needs, but may continue to underestimate sociocultural factors.
There have been many attempts in recent years to develop multi-dimensional indices of poverty and development. One of the most prominent is the Human Development Index (HDI) first produced by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 1990. Subsequent annual editions have elaborated the original concept. However, the core concepts remain stable. Instead of national income figures, which conceal the distribution of income in a country, and a lot of other important information, the HDI seeks to provide a multi-dimensional comparison of human development. This means studying the 'enabling environment' in which people can 'enjoy long, healthy, and creative lives.' Improving well-being is explicitly equated with the 'process of enlarging people's choices' [28, p.9] The three selected influences on choices are life expectancy, education, and access to resources needed for 'a decent standard of living' [28, p.10] . Three additional factors are political freedom, guaranteed human rights, and personal self-respect. Briefly, the concept of human development is 'a participatory and dynamic process' which works on two levels: on the level of wider choice, and on the level of achieved well-being. People with good health, education and expectation of a long life also need the opportunity to use their acquired capabilities. For example, they need the opportunity to employ their talents, be active in political organization, take part in social life, and so on. Since 1998, The Human Development Report also includes separate Human Poverty Indices; HPI-1 for the less-industrialized world and HPI-2 for the industrial countries. Whereas the HDI measures overall progress in a country achieving human development, the HPI measures the proportion of people who are left out of the benefits [29] .
The development of this framework (see Table 1 ), has been hailed as a great achievement. Douglas et al. comment that:
"The index is a highly sophisticated attempt to assess the infrastructure of the individual's life. The individual person is not left swinging in mid-air, without support or clues as to what might realistically be possible at that time or place. A person's chances of schooling, nutrition, life expectancy, and income, say much more about well-being than straight comparisons of income, and they give more than answers to questions about individual happiness." [26, p.241 ].
The index is also more informative than the abstract systems of needs described earlier. A positive figure indicates that the HDI rank is better than the real GDP per capita (PP$) rank, a negative the opposite Source : UNDP [29] There is scope for some elaboration of the component indicators. Literacy could be expanded to encompass numeracy. Computer competence will presumably be added, when its lack severely limits people's ability to participate in a computer-literate community. The ratio of telephones to population, and of personal computers and e-mail networks, are potential indicators of whether inhabitants of poor countries are excluded from communication with each other and with the rich. Douglas and Isherwood [30] have argued that the distribution of technology of communication sums up the meaning of the other indices of well-being. For the time being, at least, the HDI remains overwhelmingly a national level index. Where attempts have been made to apply the method at the regional level within nations, the results are often striking. For example, regional HDI disparity between the wealthiest and poorest regions in Nigeria is six points (Figure 2 ). This is larger than the gap that separates Nigeria from Cyprus which is top of the developing country league. Clearly, national level accounting smears out a lot of significant disparities within countries.
Figure 2 Regional HDI disparity in Nigeria, 1993
Source: UNDP 1996b
Another attempt at holistic representation is aimed at a more local level than the nation state. The capital assets framework was devised by Scoones [31] for evaluating sustainable rural livelihoods.
"This framework consists of analysis of the five different types of assets upon which households or communities draw to build their livelihoods" [32, p.6]. These are:
• natural capital from which resource flows for livelihoods are derived,
• social capital consisting of networks, memberships, relationships and participation in institutions, • human capital, or the skills, knowledge, health and ability to labour in pursuit of different livelihood strategies, • physical capital including transport, shelter, communications and production equipment, and • financial capital, whether savings, supplies of credit, or regular remittances which provide people with various livelihood options.
The relative strengths of the different assets can be plotted subjectively on a five axis graph giving rise to a pentagon, the shape of which will reflect the relative strength or availability of each category of asset to a household or a community (Figure 3 ). The benefit of the pentagon is to encourage holistic, rather than sectoral thinking about livelihoods. It also encourages approaches to development that build upon assets that families and communities have already within their grasp. In the words of one advocate, "there is a subtle, but important difference between starting with an analysis of strengths as opposed to an analysis of needs" [32, p.7] .
Figure 3 Types of capital assets
This schema also has the benefit of being inherently relational. The unit of analysis is the family or community rather than the individual. Furthermore, the core assumption of the sustainable livelihood approach is that those households and communities have a multiplicity of strategies available to them and that the key to their sustainability is flexibility about which strategy to pursue as circumstances change. An African subsistence farmer in the off-season or during drought becomes a wage labourer and can later revert to farming. A Swiss villager alternates between the occupations of selfemployed herdsman, community employed builder of avalanche protection infrastructure, and dishwasher employed by multi-national hotel chain depending on the season and available resources. This concept of strategy switching may be the single most important idea in promoting increased resilience of communities to climate change as well as charting a path out of poverty for millions. This brings us to our fifth proposition that eliminating poverty and developing societal resilience requires building social diversity.
How diversity contributes to societal resilience
The authors of the capital assets pentagon claim that there is no point on any single axis below which people can be considered to be poor or vulnerable. While this may be so, one of the forms of capital seems to be particularly difficult to substitute by one of the others. That is social capital defined as a somewhat disorderly network of social ties that make people value and work towards maintaining a vigorous and stable system of governance. This suggestion is consistent with a large literature, including the suggestion by Esman and Uphoff [33] a decade and a half ago that a vigorous network of participatory membership organizations is essential to overcoming mass poverty in the less industrialized world. It is also compatible with Putnam's [34] detailed empirical demonstration of the positive relationship between a rich and diverse civic life in Northern Italy, and the economic and governmental success of the northern provinces. And it is compatible with Fukuyama's [35] more recent argument that civic plurality is essential to a well-functioning democracy.
The correlation of diverse associational ties and successful government is well illustrated by Putnam's careful empirical analysis of the contrasting development patterns of effective government among the Italian regions. Putnam and his colleagues constructed a multi-attribute index to measure the institutional performance of each of Italy's 20 regions, using a heterogeneous list of 'development factors' that includes the sorts of elements that would be familiar to most of us (see Table 2 ). Moreover, subjective citizen satisfaction with government was measured, producing highly correlated results.
Table 2
Putman's index of institutional performance The highest performers overall are the former Northern Republics. The former Papal states of Central Italy perform less well, while the Southern, Mezzogiorno region fares least well. Geography, economic resources, and education are not sufficient explanations for why northern regions have higher institutional performance ratings than southern regions. For example, Campania is wealthier than Molise and Basilicata, but the latter's governments are more successful, by both objective and subjective criteria. Lombardia, Piedmonte, and Liguria are economically much better off than Emilia-Romagna and Umbria, whose institutional performance scored higher.
The factor that most closely correlates with institutional performance (and, incidentally, citizen satisfaction with government) is what Putnam terms civic engagement, measured by a number of factors prominent among which is the strength and vitality of associational life membership in choral societies, amateur soccer clubs, hunters' associations, bird-watching clubs, etc. Independent associational life outside of the family and the structures of the state is a major component of the index of civic community that Putnam constructs for comparison with institutional performance of regional governments.
The high correlation of civic community and institutional performance is startling and compelling. Not only does the correlation distinguish the high performance regions from the low performers, it accounts for variations in performance within both high-and lowperforming categories. Putnam's results also include a negative correlation of civic community with clientelism -dependence on vertical relationships of dependence and loyalty -that characterizes political and social relationships in the Mezzogiorno.
"Both the North-South gap in Italy, and the range of theories that have been offered to account for it, mirror the broader debate about development in the Third World. Why do so many countries remain underdeveloped: inadequate resources? government mistakes? centre-periphery dependencia? market failures? 'culture'? Precisely for that reason, studies of the Italian case have the potential to contribute importantly to our understanding of why many (but not all) Third World countries remain inextricably mired in poverty." [34, p.159] A major strength of Putnam's study is its longitudinal scope, which enables him to investigate the direction of causation between civic community and economic development. In effect he asks, "Does a strong civic community result from economic development, or does the civic community create conditions for economic growth?".
Putnam's statistical analysis of these pathways reveals an astonishing finding, well worth the attention of everyone concerned with sustainable development. Using measures such as agricultural and industrial employment, he shows the following:
• Civic involvement 1860-1920 is a very powerful predictor of contemporary civic community.
• Economic development (industrialization and public health) has no impact whatsoever on contemporary civics.
• Civic involvement 1860-1920 is a very powerful predictor of present socioeconomic development.
In other words, while a strong civic community reproduces itself and generates economic development (external conditions being favourable), economic modernization alone does not generate a strong civic community and, ultimately, does not sustain itself (Figure 4) . Source: Putman [34] This study clearly demonstrates the centrality of civic society and social capital to economic and political development. These factors are increasingly recognized by many in the development community who question the wisdom of investing heavily in economic and technological projects in which nourishing civic life is subjugated to the instrumental details of implementation, rather than treated as an end in itself [36] . But Putnam's results should not be a surprise. Adam Smith, hero of the market economists, told us as much in his lesser known work The Theory of Moral Sentiment, where he describes the forgotten feet of civil society without which the hidden hand of the market is dismembered from the social body. Social capital, in the form of civic life, is a precondition of economic success. We are putting the cart before the horse when we tackle poverty as primarily an economic issue. An important, but perhaps not so well understood benefit of civic pluralism and its associated trust networks is that they imbue society with an enhanced capability for complex strategy switching. That is, the society will be able to draw on its plural viewpoints to respond to new situations in new ways. Sustainability in its essence cannot be the pastoral fantasy of limiting development only to those things we can do over and over for ever and ever. It must be built on the ability to switch from a strategy that is not working, or will not work for much longer, to one that will work, at least for now. The capacity for social learning and the ability to apply what has been learned in a flexible and timely manner seems to be greatly increased by having a diversity of overlapping institutions; the result is increased societal resilience.
This suggests that there may be a need for some kind of an index of social diversity. In particular it would be useful to know what is the minimum level of institutional variation that is required for sustainability. Cultural theorists (e.g., [37] [38] [39] ) have attempted to answer this question. Based on both theoretical and empirical factors, they have identified no fewer than three basic strategies that households, communities, even firms, can switch among adaptively to cope with changes in their circumstances. Each type is a model of social solidarity that emphasizes different social arrangements for managing society and nature including three different principles for trusting. These social arrangements are discussed at some length elsewhere [39] . Here they are briefly sketched out in Table 3 . Table 3 Three institutional strategies Source: S. Rayner [39] These diverse characteristics provide each strategy with a unique viewpoint that is both facilitating and limiting:
• Hierarchies are societal gardeners, experts in system maintenance so long as the garden is not disrupted by catastrophic disruption from outside. But, when unchecked by self-organizing groups and markets, hierarchies become corrupt.
• Egalitarians are societal canaries; they provide early warning systems of external dangers as well as of internal corruption. They also tend to be repositories of local knowledge that is devalued by hierarchies and overlooked by markets. But left to themselves they are prone to factional squabbling.
• Individualists at their best provide innovation; they generate new ideas to resolve the problems created by the solutions of preceding generations. But, unchecked by hierarchy and self-organization, they are prone to extortion.
To function well, any of the three need the other two. Complex, overlapping, plural, interdependent civic institutions embodying diverse combinations of the three basic strategies represent the best means available to extend society's capabilities to develop in a sustainable fashion, even or, rather, especially when confronted with surprise. Strategy switching within these systems can be very rapid. For example, Ashok Khosla's 'Development Alternatives' is a successful community enterprise that combines all three elements; the combination can be seen as critical to its success.
As Douglas et al. [26] put it:
"Instead of commodities or material conditions, Putnam offers an institutional analysis of well-being. This is bold, because institutions are out of intellectual fashion. However, he is right; institutions embody historical decisions and shape politics. As he says, they influence outcomes because they shape actors' identities, power, and strategies, or, as Sen [40] had it, they define the individual's capabilities. Choice at any one time is limited and conditioned by preceding choices that have affected the structure of institutions. This finds its analytic expression in the idea of social capital….
The concept of social capital is an attempt to explain how successful social interaction can resolve the prisoner's dilemma and avoid the tragedy of the commons. Like physical and financial capital, social capital is productive: it aids spontaneous cooperation and creates moral resources. Successful social arrangements for the management of common pool resources depend on the level of social capital that can be mobilized and on the norms that facilitate implementation. However, since social capital is a public good, it is usually undervalued and under-supplied...." [26, p.249 ].
If, indeed, social capital turns out to be the foundation upon which other forms of capital are built, it merits the serious attention of the climate change research and policy communities. The IPCC Third Assessment Report should, at least, consider social capital and the role of civil society in relation to building resilience against climate impacts. Furthermore, the concept of diversified social capital is also relevant to the issue of national implementation of emissions reductions. It seems likely that countries with highly developed social capital assets will be better able to build consensus around mitigation goals than those whose social capital is weak. For example, Rayner and Richards [41] have suggested that social capital seems particularly pertinent for the local level implementation of land use policies designed to reduce net carbon dioxide emissions. This brings us to the issue of how to link local actions and global concerns. Paradoxically, one way may be to invert the popular maxim: "Think globally: act locally."
Think locally, act globally
Our penultimate proposition is that in the final analysis climate protection and poverty elimination may be most effectively achieved through local-level actors and their global networks.
Poverty eradication has been the goal of governments and intergovernmental organizations for decades. Climate change is a more recent goal. However, even where there has been strong normative commitment to these goals, international efforts and national policies have not proven to be very effective. Both academics and policy practitioners continue to focus policy studies at the level of the nation state, whether their focus is on the ability of states to develop solidarity with one another or to create appropriate frameworks of political and economic solidarity to implement their policy goals domestically. However, in most cases, the state is actually very far removed from the vulnerable livelihoods of the poor as well as the sources of carbon emissions. The policy levers of the state therefore, have to be very long to reach the locus of desired action. All too often, the levers of state power are not connected to anything at all at the local level where policies must be implemented by ordinary people living in face-to-face communities.
There is much variation around the world in the relationship of national to provincial and local governments. However, in the day-to-day lives of most people in the world, local government is the more salient political actor. It delivers or withholds essential services, and it mediates between the citizen and the nation state through local officials, such as police officers, who may have to monitor vehicle emissions, or building inspectors, responsible for seeing that new construction meets energy efficiency standards. Furthermore, over 50% of the world's population now lives in urban areas, contributing a significant portion of global emissions of greenhouse gases. The density, mixture, physical layout of residential and commercial neighbourhoods and so forth, all influence the energy intensity of the community and their vulnerability to climate change. Yet many of these factors are more directly under the control of community governments than of national ministries.
Already cities around the world are networking with one another at the level of municipal administrations and citizen activists, and without the intermediation of national authorities. For example, urban leaders met at the Municipal Leaders Summit for Climate Change in New York in 1993 to establish the Cities For Climate Protection program. This program was an extension of an earlier initiative linking 14 cities in the USA, Canada, Europe, and Turkey, designed to strengthen local commitment to reduce urban greenhouse gas emissions, to research and develop best practices in pilot communities, to share planning tools and experiences, and to enhance ties among municipalities across national boundaries, especially between those in industrialized and less industrialized countries [42] . The IPCC could provide useful guidance to policymakers by including a specific focus on the scope of local government.
Where even local governments are powerless, local communities can and do step in to invest their social capital in developing community-based organizations that in many cases have succeeded where national governments and intergovernmental organizations have proven ineffective. This is not however, a mere retreat to the local or the development of a fortress mentality. Increasingly these locally focused non-state actors are collaborating and coordinating across national boundaries (e.g., [43, 44] etc.). Some participants and scholarly observers view this as the emergence of a global civil society. Many of the examples of direct cross-national cooperation have focused on environmental issues, such as debt for nature trades and carbon offset projects. These have been small and scattered, but nevertheless represent important experiments in nongovernmental cooperation. On a larger scale of impact, the formation, implementation, and expansion of the stratospheric ozone regime demonstrates the potential for complementarity of governmental and non-governmental actors [45, 43] . The 20th century has closed on a world that is in every sense more socially, economically, and culturally interdependent and interconnected than ever before. At the same time it is clear that the sustainability of both social systems and the environmental systems upon which they ultimately depend rests not just with 200 or so governments agreeing and implementing climate policies, but with tens of thousands of local jurisdictions, companies, and non-governmental organizations and millions of households interconnected personally and electronically across the globe ( Figure 5 ).
Figure 5 A polycentric model of international decision making
Source: S. Rayner [38] The bulk of climate change politics may have to devolve to the non-governmental level, if policies are to become effective in the informal institutional dynamics of individuals and households. The rise of informal networks of cooperation is an important development here, spurred on via schools and colleges, various social groupings, and local businesses (for example, see [46] ). Whether policy innovation and behavioural change are led locally or nationally, they will be marked by a process of institutional learning that either moves presently peripheral concerns about climate change to the core of people's daily concerns or, at least, palpably and convincingly links climate policies to these everyday concerns. This represents another opportunity to expand the decision making focus of climate change analysis.
O'Riordan et al. [42] conclude that effective actions designed to mitigate or respond opportunistically or adaptively to climate change are likely to be those that are most fully integrated into more general policy strategies for economic and social development. The more that climate change issues are integrated into the planning perspective at the appropriate level of implementation (for example, the firm or the community), the more likely they are to achieve desired goals. Climate policies per se are bound to be hard to implement meaningfully. This conclusion recasts the issue of compliance and implementation in important and challenging ways as we move away from the idea of a rational instrumental framework of evaluation, decision, and implementation to a continuous framework of interactive negotiation in which policy explicitly becomes the formalization of actions being undertaken by a variety of actors, not just nation states.
Within the framework of national government, climate change either has to be shown to be a compelling threat that overshadows other policy demands, or it has to be integrated into the routinized decision making frameworks of government organizations and agencies whose primary policy concerns (such as finance and energy) are widely recognized as compelling. The appropriate response therefore is to build in climate concerns to the everyday concerns of people at the local level and the big concerns of policymakers at the national level. At the moment the research agendas of either the natural or social sciences provide little help or guidance for this approach, particularly at the local level. A combination of the focus on emissions (rather than, say, vulnerability) with the speaking-truth-to-power model of analysis and policymaking produces least knowledge where it could do most good -that is, at the levels of households, firms, and communities.
Joining climate change issues to issues of societal resilience opens the agenda to a broad range of focus areas, including economic development, institutional restructuring, provision of multiple strategies, fostering civil society, and strengthening indigenous arrangements (e.g., land tenure) that are working. Resilience encompasses not just preservation from harm (where this is possible) but also strengthening or establishing alternative economic activities (both market and non-market) and social structures.
Linking spatial and temporal levels
Finally, we suggest that climate change and policy impacts on the poor do not conform very well to analytic dichotomies of national and international or intragenerational and intergenerational issues.
An obvious reason to question the division of intellectual labour between international and national equity issues is the criticism that has been offered of the parallel division of intragenerational and intergenerational equity in the SAR. Intergenerational equity was almost entirely reduced to the issue of the discount rate. The somewhat technical nature of this discourse made little accommodation for philosophical, legal, and sociological perspectives on intergenerational rights and responsibilities (see, e.g., [47, 48] ). Furthermore, as Lind and Schuler point out, separating the two discussions of inter-and intragenerational equity allowed gross inconsistencies between the treatment of inter-and intratemporal transfers to pass unnoticed or, at least, unremarked in the SAR. "Many, if not most economists would subscribe to the view that intergenerational equity is probably good and that a reasonable definition of intergenerational equity within the context of an economic growth model would mean setting p (the utility discount rate) equal to 0. But if these same economists were faced with a vote on whether we ought to go ahead with an equivalent program of intragenerational equity and transfer resources from the rich to the poor until equalization occurred, very few indeed would vote for such a program if they thought it had any chance of passing." [49, p.76] Elsewhere, I have suggested that equity can best be understood as arising out of the universal human experience of social solidarity.
"What is fair may be the subject of disagreement, but the demand for fairness only arises because of the existence of community. It is very hard to imagine what fairness would mean if we did not live and work together in families, communities, firms, nations, and other social arrangements which persist over time. ...fairness is integral to the establishment and maintenance of social solidarity at every level of solidarity from the local to the global." [39] This may be one reason why we appear to be more willing to countenance equality among those living in the future than among ourselves in the present. We actually have to live in the present. Intergenerational equity, can be conceived of as solidarity with the future [39] , which can be helpful in avoiding the kinds of inconsistencies of treatment identified by Lind and Schuler. However, in practical (rather than theoretical) terms, intergenerational solidarity can only mean solidarity with our children. Children are not potential people of the future; they are real people, representative of both the future and of the present. Yet 8,000 children die every day from the simplest of causes, diarrhoeal dehydration, largely from lack of access to clean water supplies, a problem that can only be exacerbated by climate change. It may be worth considering why climate discussions focus so much on the immediate present and on the distant future, to the neglect of the intermediate future of the generation that is currently growing up under our stewardship. This would suggest focusing analysis and policy efforts on a 40-year timescale, which also happens to be an appropriate timescale for the turnover of most capital infrastructure.
Furthermore, it may be worthwhile considering whether we are looking too far ahead in the analysis of benefits and costs of climate change and policies and wondering too hard about technocratic indices of vulnerability. Might it not be more important to know we are moving in the right direction than to know exactly how far we have to go? Locally focused measures for building social capital would help to reduce poverty and inequity for our children and empower them, in turn, to participate in policies for sustainable social and environmental progress. Consideration of these possibilities of timescale and focus in the IPCC Third Assessment Report could have made a significant contribution to our thinking about policies designed to alleviate both poverty and climate change. However, at this stage it seems likely that we will have to wait for the Fourth Assessment before this will happen.
Another point is that the problem of poverty is not exclusive to the less-industrialized countries, a fact that is frequently glossed over in discussions and negotiations of climate change policies.
In fact there is very little positive relationship between a country's average income and its level of poverty. The USA has the highest per capita income in the industrialized world and also leads in the proportion of its population living in poverty [29] . One fifth of its population is functionally illiterate. According to UNDP [29] more than 100 million people in the OECD have less than 50% of the median personal disposable income and a similar number of OECD citizens are homeless.
The other side of the coin is that the problem of over-consumption (leading to carbon emissions and depriving others of opportunities to develop) is not an exclusive preserve of the industrialized world. If we were to assume that the affluent middle class in India is about 30 million and is as energy efficient as the average Japanese citizen (2.5 tC/capita/annum), the carbon dioxide emissions of the Indian middle class alone would exceed the total emissions of Australia.
Most less-industrialized countries advocate per capita equality as the equity principle upon which carbon emissions rights should be allocated. However, these examples highlight a concern in some segments of the industrialized world that climate policies appear to have the potential to redistribute wealth from the poor of the North to the wealthy of the South. Carbon taxes in OECD countries are likely to drive up the costs of basic goods such as food and to further limit personal mobility. Unless we are willing and able to address issues of poverty and inequity within the OECD countries, there are likely to be political obstacles to climate policies that appear to violate the lowest common denominator equity principle, which neither climate change nor climate policies should be permitted to worsen existing inequities.
Simultaneously addressing the gross distributional inequities within both the North and the South seems to be both an equity requirement and a necessary political condition for the success of any global climate policy.
Conclusion
Taken in the aggregate, the Earth's resources can maintain a total population considerably larger than we presently have or are likely to see in the next century [50] . Similarly, as recounted by Weyant and Yanigisawa [51] , the technical potential for energy conservation measures is often calculated as very large, and the potential contribution of new technologies to the energy mix is high. The issues of climate change and poverty are not problems of sheer numbers of people relative to the total resource base or available technology, but one of institutional opportunities and constraints, for example, where population is concentrated in environmentally fragile areas or the allocation of resources and entrenched arrangements that favour energy inefficiency and fossil fuels. Both efficiency and fairness play the causal roles in the energy efficiency gap, as they do in poverty and famine.
How governments and other institutions allocate resources is an equity issue. Proposals for theoretically efficient emissions reduction protocols often founder because they are fair only in the sense that they cost the least at the macro level. The explicit basis for national and international actions is maximizing utility in macro terms; increasing GNP is not about making the Joneses better off but about making the country as a whole better off, whether or not that means making poor people worse off relative to the rich. Predictably, some people object that they will be disadvantaged disproportionately, and proposals are made to provide resource transfers (financial payments) to compensate such groups.
But equity is not just about how societies distribute resources. It is also the basis for generating social capital necessary, alongside economic, natural, and intellectual capital, for sustainability. Writing about climate change, Thompson and Rayner [52] remind us that the demand for fairness arises out of the establishment of publicly shared expectations for the conduct of community relations. Fairness is integral to the establishment and maintenance of social relations at every level from the micro to the macro, from the local to the global. Because there are differences among the ways in which communities and other institutions organize their social relations, there are differences among the expectations of fairness that people use for judging policy processes and outcomes. In turn, because people everywhere buttress their arguments about what is right by invoking ideas of what is natural, they also exhibit important and sometimes irreconcilable differences in their judgments of vulnerability. Thus, the distribution of ideas of fairness represent important institutional constraints on the perceived urgency of climate policies as well as of their efficacy and acceptability.
In this way, climate change also provides an arena for debating a wide variety of social, economic, and political issues that society finds difficult to address directly. These include the unequal distribution of wealth within and among nations and the tension between the imperatives of independence and interdependence at all levels of social organization. Much of the debate about equity in climate change mitigation is an extension of the broader debate about international economic development and political empowerment. Clearly, there is a social benefit to be obtained from the existence of an arena in which potential changes in the socioeconomic and political status quo can be explored as deriving from natural imperatives rather than human agency.
But the situation also presents potential dangers for human society. On the one hand, it is plausible that the opportunity costs of debating significant social and economic change in a surrogate arena may reduce society's capacity to make desirable changes. For example, some economists have focused on the issue of opportunity costs [49] . It is plausible that if policymakers allocate significant economic and political capital to mitigating and adapting to climate change as a way of enhancing the development of the poor in less industrialized countries, they may be reducing the level of resources actually available to fight poverty, hunger, and ignorance. On the other hand, reservations about using the opportunity that a potential natural crisis provides for social reform may lead decision makers to ignore or override signals that nature is, indeed, about to use its veto over human behaviour. Reluctance to leverage the poverty agenda with climate change could lead to disaster for the poor. The solution to this dilemma of national policymakers may be to routinely support child-centered, local measures that encourage the development of social capital as the best means to achieve both climate and poverty agendas.
